AGENDA

THURSDAY, JUNE 1, 2017

7:30-8:15	**Registration and Breakfast,** *Location : North Building, outside N302*
8:15-8:30	**Welcome and Housekeeping,** *Location : North Building, N302 A&B*

Plenary Session
Location : North Building, N302 A&B

8:30-9:00 ***Sample Complexity of Multi-Item Profit Maximization,***
Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon Computer Science

9:00-9:30 ***Estimating Ad Effectiveness Using Bayesian Structural Time Series,***
Hal Varian, Google

9:30-10:00 **Break outside N302**

10:00-11:30

Session A: Platforms & the Sharing Economy	**Session B: Auctions & Pricing**
Location: N302 A&B	*Location: Zambrano Hall, Z301*
Peer-to-Peer Product Sharing: Implications for Ownership, Usage and Social Welfare in the Sharing Economy Saif Benjaafar*, University of Minnesota	***Credible Mechanism Design*** Mohammad Akbarpour*, Stanford University; Shengwu Li Harvard University
Market Structure with the Entry of Peer-to-Peer Platforms: the Case of Hotels and Airbnb Chiara Farronato*, Harvard University; Andrey Fradkin, MIT	***Information Acquisition Costs of Matching Mechanisms*** Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research New England; Jacob Leshno, Columbia University; Irene Lo*, Columbia University; Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research New England
Discrimination with Incomplete Information in the Sharing Economy: Field Evidence from Airbnb Dennis Zhang*, Washington University in St. Louis; Jun Li, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan; Ruomeng Cui, Indiana University	***Listing Policies and Market Thickness in Online B2B Auctions Markets*** Wenchang Zhang*, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland; Kostas Bimpikis, Stanford Graduate School of Business; Wedad Elmaghraby, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland; Ken Moon, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
How Do Complementors Respond to the Threat of Platform Owner Entry? Evidence from the Mobile App Market Wen Wen, University of Texas at Austin; Feng Zhu*, Harvard University	***Descending Price Algorithm for Determining the Maximum Market Clearing Price in Matching Markets*** Shih-Tang Su*, University of Michigan; Vijay Subramanian, University of Michigan; Grant Schoenebeck, University of Michigan; Dr. Jacob Abernethy, University of Michigan
Route Preference and Station Network in the Bike Share System Fanyin Zheng*, Columbia Business School; Pu He, Columbia Business School; Karan Girotra, INSEAD; Elena Belavina, Chicago Booth School of Business	***Contingent Stimulus in Crowdfunding*** Longyuan Du*, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto; Ming Hu, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto; Jiahua Wu, Imperial College Business School, Imperial College London

Plenary Session
Location : North Building, N302 A&B

11:30-12:00 ***Marketplaces, Intermediaries, and Industry Structure,***
Susan Athey, Stanford Graduate School of Business

12:00-12:30 ***Learning From Reviews,***
Asu Ozdaglar, MIT Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

12:30-2:00 **Lunch at Community Court**

2:00-3:30	**Session A: Learning** *Location: N302 A*	**Session B: Ride Sharing** *Location: Bass Center, B400*
	Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium Yonatan Gur*, Stanford GSB; Santiago Balseiro, Duke University	***What Drives Pricing Behavior in Peer-to-Peer Markets? Evidence from the Carsharing Platform BlaBlaCar*** Robert Hammond, North Carolina State University; Mehdi Farajallah*, Rennes School of Business; Thierry Penard, CREM, University of Rennes
	A Personalized BDM Mechanism for Efficient Market Intervention Experiments Imanol Arrieta Ibarra*, Stanford University; Johan Ugander, Stanford University	***Ride-Hailing Networks with Strategic Drivers: The Impact of Platform Control Capabilities on Performance*** Philipp Afeche, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto; Zhe Liu*, Columbia Business School; Costis Maglaras, Columbia Business School
	Dynamic Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions: Learning from Bids Yash Kanoria*, Columbia Business School; Hamid Nazerzadeh, USC Marshall	***Measuring Consumer Surplus in the On-Demand Economy: the Case of Ride Sharing*** Meng Liu*, MIT; Chungsang Lam, Clemson University
	Thompson Sampling for the MNL-Bandit Shipra Agrawal, Columbia University; Vashist Avadhanula*, Columbia University; Vineet Goyal, Columbia University; Assaf Zeevi, Columbia University	***Tâtonnement in Markets for Trips: Evidence from Uber*** Jonathan Hall, Uber Technologies; John Horton*, NYU Stern; Dan Knoepfle, Uber Technologies
	Dynamic Data-Driven Estimation of Non-Parametric Choice Models Nam Ho-Nguyen, Carnegie Mellon University; Fatma Kilinc-Karzan*, Carnegie Mellon University	***Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase*** Juan Castillo*, Stanford University; Dan Knoepfle, Uber Technologies; Glen Weyl, Microsoft Research
3:30-4:00	**Break outside N302**	
4:00-5:30	**Session A: Dynamics & Market Design** *Location: N302 A*	**Session B: Advertising** *Location: Bass Center, B400*
	Dynamic Recommendation at Checkout under Inventory Constraint Will Ma*, MIT	***Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets*** Vince Conitzer, Duke; Christian Kroer, CMU; Eric Sodomka*, Facebook; Nicolas Stier-Moses, Facebook
	A Theory of Discounts and Deadlines in Retail Search Bradley Larsen*, Stanford University	***Truthful Equilibrium in Sponsored Search with Endogenous Budgets*** Dragos Florin CIOCAN, INSEAD; Krishnamurthy Iyer*, Cornell University
	How to sell a database? Kimon Drakopoulos*, USC, Data Sciences and Operations; Ali Makhdoumi, MIT	***Sustaining a Good Impression: Mechanisms for Selling Impressions at Ad Exchanges*** Sameer Mehta*, The University of Texas at Dallas; Milind Dawande, The University of Texas at Dallas; Ganesh Janakiraman, The University of Texas at Dallas; Vijay Mookerjee, The University of Texas at Dallas
	Dynamic Mechanism Design under Positive Commitment Ilan Lobel*, NYU Stern School of Business; Renato Paes Leme, Google	***Effectiveness of Paid Search Advertising: Experimental Evidence*** Michael Luca (HBS) *
	The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints Francisco Castro*, Columbia Business School; Gabriel Weintraub, Stanford; Dirk Bergemann, Yale University	***Does Advertising Serve as a Signal? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Mobile Search*** Harikesh Nair*, Stanford University; Navdeep Sahni, Stanford University
5:30-7:00	**Reception and Posters at N302 B&C**	

FRIDAY, JUNE 2, 2017

8:00-8:30 **Breakfast**
Location : North Building, outside N302

Plenary Session
Location : North Building, N302

8:30-9:00 ***Attribution in Multi-Channel Advertising,***
Garud Iyengar, Columbia Industrial Engineering and Operations Research

9:00-9:30 ***Balancing Supply and Demand in a Two-Sided Marketplace,***
Bob Phillips, Uber Technologies

9:30-10:00 **Break outside N302**

10:00-11:30

Session A: Information in Matching Market *Location: N302 A&B*	**Session B: Matching Markets** *Location: Bass Center, B400*
Flash Organizations Daron Acemoglu, MIT; Mohamed Mostagir*, University of Michigan; Asuman Ozdaglar, MIT	***Facilitating the search for partners on matching platforms: Restricting agent actions*** Daniela Saban*, Stanford University; Yash Kanoria, Columbia
At What Quality and What Price?: Eliciting Buyer Preferences as a Platform Design Problem* John Horton*, NYU Stern; Ramesh Johari, Stanford University	***Stable Matchings in Metric Spaces: Modeling Real-World Preferences using Proximity*** Hossein Abadi*, Stanford University; Balaji Prabhakar, Stanford University
Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency in Bargaining Environments Bobak Pakzad-Hurson*, Stanford University	***Online Stochastic Matching in a Ride-Sharing Platform*** Chinmoy Dutta*, Lyft; Adam Greenhall, Lyft; Keshav Puranmalka, Lyft; Chris Sholley, Lyft
Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets Itai Ashlagi*, Stanford University; Mark Braverman, Princeton, Yash Kanoria, Columbia; Peng Shi, MSR	***Spatial Pricing in Ride-Sharing Networks*** Kostas Bimpikis, Stanford Graduate School of Business; Ozan Candogan*, University of Chicago; Daniela Saban, Stanford University
Adaptive Matching for Expert Systems with Uncertain Task Types Virag Shah*, Microsoft-Inria Joint Center; Lennart Gulikers, Microsoft-Inria Joint Center; Laurent Massoulie, Microsoft-Inria Joint Center; Milan Vojnovic, London School of Economics	***Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework*** Siddhartha Banerjee, Cornell University; Daniel Freund*, Cornell University; Thodoris Lykouris, Cornell University

Plenary Session
Location : North Building, N302

11:30-12:00 ***The Limit of Rationality in Choice Modeling,***
Paat Rusmevichientong, USC Marshall School of Business

12:00-12:30 ***The Economics and Computer Science of a Spectrum Reallocation,***
Paul Milgrom, Stanford Economics

12:30-2:00 **Lunch at Community Court**

2:00-3:30	**Session A: Social Influence & Reputation** *Location: N302*	**Session B: Revenue Management & Dynamic Pricing** *Location: Zambrano Hall, Z301*
	Invite Your Friend and You'll Move Up in Line: Leveraging Social Ties via Operational Incentives Luyi Yang*, University of Chicago; Laurens Debo, Dartmouth College	***Pricing Wars in Cloud Computing: Utilization-Based versus Reservation-Based Pricing Schemes*** Shi Chen*, Foster School of Business, University of Washington; Hau Lee, Stanford Graduate School of Business; Kamran Moinzadeh, Foster School of Business, University of Washington
	Pairwise Comparisons for Online Reputation Systems Nikhil Garg*, Stanford University; Ramesh Johari, Stanford University	***Dynamic Pricing in High-dimensions*** Hamid Nazerzadeh*, USC Marshall
	Bilateral Ratings and P2P Market Segmentation T. Tony Ke*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Baojun Jiang, Washington University in St. Louis; Monic Sun, Boston University	***On the Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of Strategic Customers*** Yiwei Chen*, Singapore University of Technology and Design; Vivek Farias, MIT
	Certification, Reputation and Entry: An Empirical Analysis Xiang Hui*, MIT; Maryam Saeedi, CMU; Giancarlo Spagnolo, SITE, Tor Vergata, Eief, CEPR; Steve Tadelis , Amazon, Berkeley	***Personalized Dynamic Pricing with Machine Learning*** Gah-Yi Ban, London Business School; Bora Keskin*, Duke University
	Promotion Planning of Network Goods Saed Alizamir, Yale University; Ningyuan Chen, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology ; Vahideh Manshadi*, Yale University	***Market Making, Dynamic Pricing, and Information Aggregation in Spread Betting Markets*** Adam Schultz*, University of Chicago Booth School of Business; John Birge, University of Chicago Booth School of Business; Bora Keskin, Duke University
3:30-4:00	**Break outside N302**	
	Plenary Session *Location : North Building, N302*	
4:00-4:30	***Learning Preferences with Side Information,*** Vivek Farias, MIT Sloan School of Management	
4:30-5:00	***Decision Making at Scale: Algorithms, Platforms, and Mechanisms,*** Ashish Goel, Stanford Management Science and Engineering	
5:00-5:30	***Auctions in the Online Display Advertising Chain: A Case for Independent Campaign Management,*** Omar Besbes, Columbia Business School	

PLENARY TALKS

Sample Complexity of Multi-Item Profit Maximization

Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon Computer Science

June 1, 2017, 8:30-9:00 AM

Abstract: In multi-item settings, it is typically unrealistic to assume that the designer has a prior over buyers' valuations. We analyze revenue-maximizing sales mechanisms when the designer has samples from the prior, as introduced by Likhodedov and Sandholm in AAAI-04. We provide generalization guarantees that bound the difference between profit on the sample and profit over the unknown prior. Our overarching theorem uses Rademacher complexity to measure intrinsic complexity of widely-studied single- and multi-item auction classes, such as affine maximizers, virtual valuations combinatorial auctions, lambda-auctions, and mixed bundling auctions. It also applies to linear and non-linear single- and multi-item pricing. Furthermore, it enables one to determine the optimal complexity to select in mechanism hierarchies.

This is joint work with Nina Balcan and Ellen Vitercik.

Estimating Ad Effectiveness Using Bayesian Structural Time Series

Hal Varian, Google

June 1, 2017, 9:00-9:30 AM

Abstract: I describe a flexible model for estimating ad effectiveness using synthetic controls. The methods described can be used for many other kinds of prediction, causal inference, and anomaly detection.

Marketplaces, Intermediaries, and Industry Structure

Susan Athey, Stanford Graduate School of Business

June 1, 2017, 11:30 AM-12:00 PM

Abstract: Marketplaces and digital platforms make it easier for consumers to transact with a wide range of sellers. One implication of this trend is that market share may be redistributed from large firms to small firms or even individual entrepreneurs. The welfare consequences of this shift varies from industry to industry. It may cut out previously existing middlemen, and it may change the incentives to provide quality service. I review evidence about these trends in a variety of industries, and then focus on the case study of the news industry, where aggregators and intermediaries (such as Google News and Facebook) have profound effects on the news people read. I study the effect of the shutdown of Google News in Spain in December 2014, which occurred in response to legislation in Spain targeted at Google News. Evidence from the shutdown shows that Google News is a substitute for top news outlets and a complement for smaller outlets, consistent with the dual role of an aggregator as a search engine that covers a large number of news

outlets, and as a direct competitor to the largest news outlets as a place to read news. I then present recent evidence of similar types of redistribution occurring among heavy Facebook users in the 2016 election.

Learning From Reviews

Asu Ozdaglar, MIT Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

June 1, 2017, 12:00-12:30 PM

Abstract: Many online platforms present summaries of reviews by previous users. Even though such reviews could be useful, previous users leaving reviews are typically a selected sample of those who have purchased the good in question, and may consequently have a biased assessment. In this paper, we construct a simple model of dynamic Bayesian learning and profit-maximizing behavior of online platforms to investigate whether such review systems can successfully aggregate past information and the incentives of the online platform to choose the relevant features of the review system.

On the consumer side, we assume that each individual cares about the underlying quality of the good in question, but in addition has heterogeneous ex ante and ex post preferences (meaning that she has a different strength of preference for the good in question than other users, and her enjoyment conditional on purchase is also a random variable). After purchasing a good, depending on how much they have enjoyed it, users can decide to leave a positive or a negative review (or leave no review if they do not have strong preferences). New users observe a summary statistic of past reviews (such as fraction of all reviews that are positive or fraction of all users that have left positive review etc.). Our first major result shows that, even though reviews come from a selected sample of users, Bayesian learning ensures that as the number of potential users grows, the assessment of the underlying state converges almost surely to the true quality of the good. More importantly, we provide a tight characterization of the speed of learning (which is a contribution relative to most of the works in this area that focus on whether there is learning or not). Under the assumption that the online platform receives a constant revenue from every user that purchases (because of commissions from sellers or from advertising revenues), we then show that, in any Bayesian equilibrium, the profits of the online platform are a function of the speed of learning of users. Using this result, we study the design of the review system by the online platform.

This is joint work with Daron Acemoglu, Ali Makhdoumi, and Azarakhsh Malekian.

Attribution in Multi-Channel Advertising

Garud Iyengar, Columbia Industrial Engineering and Operations Research

June 2, 2017, 8:30-9:00 AM

Abstract: Customers are exposed to multiple advertisements across many different channels before they make a purchase, i.e. convert. A key question facing the advertising industry is that of attributing portions of conversion to the various channels that potentially influenced the conversion. We propose a framework for attribution that accounts for budgets and marginal impact of each channel. We also evaluate current practices using this framework.

Joint work with Omar Besbes, Antoine Desir, and Vineet Goyal.

Balancing Supply and Demand in a Two-Sided Marketplace

Bob Phillips, Uber Technologies

June 2, 2017, 9:00-9:30 AM

Abstract: Uber faces the challenge of balancing supply and demand in a two-sided marketplace in which it has no direct control over either side of the market. This poses a number of important questions. What does it mean for a market to be "balanced"? What does it mean to be "over- supplied" or "under-supplied" and what are the costs of being in either situation? What actions should be taken when a market is out of balance? We discuss some of the approaches that Uber uses to address these questions in its highly dynamic temporal-spatial marketplaces.

The Limit of Rationality in Choice Modeling

Paat Rusmevichientong, USC Marshall School of Business

June 2, 2017, 11:30 AM-12:00 PM

Abstract: Choice-based demand models based on the random utility maximization (RUM) principle are routinely used in academic literature and industry practice. However, the RUM principle may be violated in practice because customer preferences may not be rational. This raises the following empirical questions: (a) Given a dataset consisting of offer sets and individual choices, are the observed choice probabilities consistent with the RUM principle? (b) If not, what is the degree of inconsistency?

We formulate the problem of quantifying the limit of rationality (LoR) in choice modeling applications. Computing LoR is intractable in the worst case, but we identify the source of complexity through new concepts of rational separation and choice graph. By exploiting the graph structure, we provide practical methods to compute LoR efficiently for a large class of applications. Applying our methods to real-world grocery sales data, we identify product categories for which going beyond rational choice models is necessary to obtain acceptable performance.

Joint work with Srikanth Jagabathula (NYU).

The Economics and Computer Science of a Spectrum Reallocation

Paul Milgrom, Stanford Economics

June 2, 2017, 12:00-12:30 PM

Abstract: The recent "incentive auction" of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission was the first auction to re-allocate radio frequencies between two different kinds of uses: from broadcast television to wireless Internet access. The design challenge was not just to choose market rules to govern a fixed set of potential trades, but also to determine the broadcasters' property rights, the goods to be exchanged, the quantities to be traded, the computational

procedures, and even some of the performance objectives. An essential and unusual challenge was to make the auction simple enough for human participants while still ensuring that the computations would be tractable and capable of delivering nearly efficient outcomes.

Learning Preferences with Side Information

Vivek Farias, MIT Sloan School of Management

June 2, 2017, 4:00-4:30 PM

Abstract: Product and content personalization is now ubiquitous in e-commerce. Available transactional data is typically too sparse for this task. As such, firms today seek to use a variety of information on the interactions between a product and a customer to drive personalization decisions. We formalize this problem as one of recovering a large-scale matrix with side information in the form of additional matrices of conforming dimension. Viewing the matrix we seek to recover and the side information we have as slices of a tensor, we consider the problem of Slice Recovery, which is to recover specific slices of 'simple' tensors from noisy observations of the entire tensor. We provide an efficient algorithm for slice recovery that is practical for massive datasets and provides a significant performance improvement over state of the art incumbent approaches to tensor recovery. Further, we establish near-optimal recovery guarantees that in an important regime represent an order improvement over the best available results for this problem. Experiments on data from a music streaming service demonstrate the performance and scalability of our algorithm.

Decision Making at Scale: Algorithms, Platforms, and Mechanisms

Ashish Goel, Stanford Management Science and Engineering

June 2, 2017, 4:30-5:00 PM

Abstract: YouTube competes with Hollywood as an entertainment channel, and also supplements Hollywood by acting as a distribution mechanism. Twitter has a similar relationship to news media, and Coursera to Universities. But there are no online alternatives for making democratic decisions at large scale as a society. In this talk, we will describe some algorithmic approaches towards large scale decision making that we are exploring. In particular, we will describe algorithms for voting in elections which design a budget, and for deliberative processes where a group decision in made via a succession of individual iteration (inspired by prediction markets) or small group interactions (inspired by Nash bargaining). We will also present general impossibility and fairness results for cardinal utilities given ordinal votes, under the metric assumption.

We will also describe our experience running crowdsourced democracy processes in the US, Canada, and Finland. Finally, we will outline several open algorithmic and game-theoretic problems in this space.

This represents joint work with Tanja Aitamurto, Brandon Fain, Nikhil Garg, Vijay Kamble, Anilesh Krishnaswamy, David Marn, Kamesh Munagala, and Sukolsak Sakshuwong.

Auctions in the Online Display Advertising Chain: A Case for Independent Campaign Management

Omar Besbes, Columbia Business School

June 2, 2017, 5:00-5:30 PM

Abstract: In many auctions, buyers can be represented by an intermediary that manages their bidding process, along with the bidding process of other buyers. Notably, in the real-time bidding market for online display advertising, in which advertisers bid for impressions through intermediaries called demand side platforms (DSPs), this is more the norm than the exception. In turn, intermediaries, when deciding what to bid on behalf of their customers, strategize to maximize some internal objective and may only submit a single bid to limit competition on a given item, leading to some form of collusion. In the present work, we propose a framework to analyze the implications of such an active/centralized role by DSPs in a general market. We take as a benchmark the case in which each DSP would manage the bidding process of each advertiser it represents independently of other buyers, a case we refer to as multi-bidding. We characterize the impact of the adoption of multi-bidding (together with intermediaries) in various regimes of interest and, quite remarkably, establish that multi-bidding leads to a Pareto improvement in the value chain under a very broad set of market characteristics. We discuss implications for market norms. (Joint work with A. Allouah.)

POSTER PRESENTATIONS

On the Virtue of Being Regular and Predictable: A Structural Analysis of the Primary Dealer System in the United States Treasury Auctions
Eiichiro Kazumori, SUNY

Budget Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions
Santiago Balseiro, Duke University; Anthony Kim, Stanford University; Mohammad Mahdian, Google Research; Vahab Mirrokni, Google Research

Big Data Mathematical Economics: Approaches from the Fixed Income Field
Sharada Kalanidhi, Stanford University

Pricing Responses to Platform Leakage: Optimal Matching Platform Design When Matches Are Irrevocable
Isaias Chaves Villamizar, Stanford University

Obvious mistakes in a strategically simple college admissions environment
Sandor Sovago, VU Amsterdam; Ran Shorrer, PSU

Edgeworth Cycles in Pharmaceutical Prices from Procurement Auctions in Denmark
Frederik Hauschultz, University of Copenhagen; Harry J. Paarsch, University of Central Florida; Anders Munk-Nielsen, University of Copenhagen

Unraveling and Bilaterial Power in Two-sided Matching: Evidence from China College Admission
Yuqing Hu, University of Southern California

Motivating Participation and Effort in Innovation Contests
Konstantinos Stouras, Darden School of Business, University of Virginia; Jeremy Hutchison-Krupat, Darden School of Business, University of Virginia; Raul O. Chao, Darden School of Business, University of Virginia

Boosted Second-Price Auctions: Simple Mechanisms to Capture Heterogeneity
Hamid Nazerzadeh, USC Marshall; Negin Golrezaei, USC Marshall

Economic Value of Texts: Evidence from Online Debt Crowdfunding
Qiang Gao, City University of New York; Mingfeng Lin, University of Arizona

Social Learning from Online Reviews with Product Choice
Stefano Vaccari, MEMOTEF Department, La Sapienza University of Rome

Mean Field Equilibria of Pricing and Work-Quality Selection Games in Internet Marketplaces
Vamseedhar Reddyvari Raja, Texas A&M University; Srinivas Shakkottai, Texas A&M University; Vijay Subramanian, University of Michigan

Drivers, Riders and Service Providers: The impact of the sharing economy on Mobility
Costas Courcoubetis, Singapore University of Technology and Design

E-commerce Platforms and International Trade: A Large-Scale Field Experiment
Xiang Hui, MIT

Rotating Proposer Mechanisms for Team Formation
Chen Hajaj, Vanderbilt University

Conflicted Immediacy Provision
Yu An, Stanford University; Zeyu Zheng, Stanford University

Oblivious Dynamic Mechanism Design
Vahab Mirrokni, Google; Renato Paes Leme, Google; Pingzhong Tang, Tsinghua University; Song Zuo, Tsinghua University

Dynamic Matching in School Choice: Efficient Seat Reallocation After Late Cancellations
Itai Feigenbaum, Lehman College and the Graduate Center, CUNY; Yash Kanoria, Columbia; Irene Lo, Columbia University; Jay Sethuraman, Columbia University

Where You Live Matters: The Impact of Local Financial Market Competition in Managing Online Peer-To-Peer Loans
Mohammed Alyakoob, Purdue University; Mohammad Rahman, Purdue University; Zaiyan Wei, Purdue University

Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers
David Lingenbrink, Cornell University; Krishnamurthy Iyer, Cornell University

Machine Learning-based Combinatorial Auctions
Sven Seuken, University of Zurich

Misaligned Incentives in Kidney Exchange
Itai Ashlagi, Stanford

Matching While Learning
Ramesh Johari, Stanford University; Vijay Kamble, Stanford University; Yash Kanoria, Columbia Business School

Coordinating Supply and Demand on an On-demand Service Platform with Impatient Customers
Rick So, UC Irvine

Dynamic Pricing Game with Loyal Demand Component
Darius Walczak, PROS Inc; Siddharth Singh, CMU